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Abstract
Energy subsidies can account for a large share of government expenditures in some GCC countries. In light of fiscal
imbalances since 2014, these countries have reiterated their intention to decrease subsidies and substitute them with more
targeted support systems. This paper briefly outlines the extent of energy subsidies. The scope and the drivers of the subsidy
reform agenda are outlined, citing recent literature. Some instruments are explained such as adjustment of electricity or water
tariffs, increasing of fuel prices, and compensation of citizens through cash transfers. However, the adopted reforms are not
yet comprehensive and do not alter the social contract of rentier states.
c⃝ 2019 Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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1. Introduction
Energy subsidies are commonplace across developed and developing countries. Post-tax subsidies accounted for
around $5.3 trillion, or 6.5%, of global GDP in 2015, while they can reach about 13%–18% of GDP in developing
countries in Asia, the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) region, or the Commonwealth [1]. Such subsidies
refer to fossil fuel subsidies that can target fossil fuels or electricity prices, leading to reductions in energy costs for
consumers or producers, or a revenue increase for energy suppliers [2]. In this sense, energy subsidies are consumer-
and producer-based. They imply any preferential treatment of fossil fuel producers or the fact that consumers are
paying low prices in comparison to the full economic costs [3].
While producer subsidies can be hidden and difficult to quantify, the measurement of consumer subsidies is
straightforward simply through comparing the prices paid to prices considered to be efficient [1]. Efficient consumer
prices should account for the supply cost, but so also should externalities that are usually accommodated through
corrective or “Pigouvian” taxes. Other taxes such as value-added taxes (VAT) or general sales taxes (GST) are
often added to energy consumer prices to raise revenues. Pre-tax consumer energy subsidies therefore apply when
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consumers pay less than the supply cost, while post-tax consumer subsidies apply if the price is lower than the supply
cost plus the mentioned taxes. While calculating this so-called price-gap can give an estimate of consumer subsidies,
there are other measurement approaches for different kinds of consumer and producer subsidies, e.g., quantifying
specific support programs, financial transfers, or externalities [4].
The justification for different forms of energy subsidies varies from one case to another and includes arguments
related to political economy, social welfare, and history. The controversial debates involving reforming these
subsidies need to be understood in the context of raising fiscal deficits, energy scarcity, and the environmental
externalities or damages of energy subsidization. In fact, on a global level, the elimination of post-tax energy
subsidies can result in $2.9 trillion in government revenues and a reduction of carbon dioxide emissions by 20% [1].
The concrete country-level impacts of recent energy subsidy reforms on fiscal imbalances, welfare, and employment
have been investigated in several studies in the MENA region (e.g., [5,6]) or the countries of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) (e.g. [7]). The GCC countries represent an illustrative case of the complex political economy of
energy subsidies in terms of political drivers, economic costs, and reform needs. This paper outlines the challenge,
explains the experiences, and presents the drivers, the reform agenda, and its instruments in the overall context of
socio-economic and environmental change in the region.
2. Omnipresent subsidies and uneven reforms experiences in the MENA region
The MENA region holds the highest share of global pre-tax energy subsidies, at around $237 trillion (48%) of
global subsidies in 2011, accounting for around 9% of the region’s GDP [8]. At the same time, energy resources
are abundant, except in some countries such as the net oil-importing countries (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan,
and Lebanon). For the other net oil-exporting countries, hydrocarbons represent the main export goods in the
region, accounting for more than 80% in half of the MENA countries, and above 60% in the others except for the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) [9]. In 2013/14, energy subsidy expenditure accounted for around 20% of government
spending in Egypt and 30% in Yemen [5].
In fact, energy subsidies in the MENA region significantly exceed food subsidies (e.g., 0.7% of GDP in 2011), and
are divided into subsidies on petroleum products (50% of pre-tax energy subsidies), electricity (26%), and natural
gas (23%) [8]. These subsidies can, however, result in serious fiscal troubles in net importing countries, increase
vulnerabilities to global oil prices in net exporting countries, and lead to, in comparison to other developing regions,
above-average energy intensities of consumption [8]. With a higher energy intensity, higher carbon emissions and
environmental damage can be expected. El-Katiri and Fattouh [5] explained some of the adverse impacts of energy
subsidies such as revenues losses, underinvestment in energy infrastructure, the relatively higher share of subsidies
to the non-poor households, energy smuggling due to price differences among countries, or distortions in local
energy markets. Another adverse impact is on the development of renewable energy markets in the region. For
example, Poudineh et al. [10] reviewed the obstacles to the deployment of renewables in the region and suggested a
combination of market liberalization efforts through a gradual removal of subsidies and the provision of investment
incentives for renewables.
Overall, phasing out energy subsidies can have important positive spill-overs on fiscal balances, consumption
levels, ecological concerns, and the deployment of clean technologies. In this context, governments in the MENA
region have recently started to reconsider energy subsidies. Verma [11] reviewed the history of these reforms,
in particular the reform waves in six countries: Iran (2010), Yemen (2010–2014), Jordan (2012), Egypt (2014),
Morocco (2013–2014), and Tunisia (2012–14). Some drivers behind these reforms are energy price volatility, the
fiscal troubles of MENA countries, a worldwide push for energy subsidy reforms, and the availability of fiscal space
for compensating vulnerable groups through welfare transfers [12].
Subsidy reforms in the MENA region are still underway, while some countries have reversed some of the reforms
due to resistances and political turmoil. For example, in June 2018, Egypt decided to cut electricity subsidies
leading to a rise in tariffs of around 26%, while all subsidies are due to be phased out by 2021–2022. In Jordan,
the government had to abandon plans to raise income tax together with increases in fuel and electricity prices
due to widespread protests in June 2018, which ousted the cabinet that proposed these plans. Another example is
the contribution of subsidy reforms to the rise of the Houthis who took over the government in Yemen in 2014,
leading to the intervention of a military coalition led by Saudi Arabia, and consequently the current civil war.
Al-Weshali et al. [13] examined how the reduction of diesel subsidies from 40% to 60% in the period after 2011
led to significant revenue losses among farmers and fueled regional political tensions. As a result, these subsidies
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were used for mobilizing protests, thus contributing to the armed uprising of the Houthi rebels. Political tensions
due to subsidy reforms were also observed in other MENA countries. As a result, energy subsidy reforms were
neither comprehensive nor followed through in many cases in the MENA region (see cases in [5,6]).
3. Rentier states under pressure — the case of the GCC
The GCC region belongs to the group of world regions with the highest energy reserves and the highest subsidies
and intensities. The GCC countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) jointly hold around
40% of global oil reserves and 20% of gas reserves [14]. Table 1 gives some key data on energy subsidies in the
region for the years 2014 and 2016, which represent the core subsidy reform period. Low energy prices affect the
energy efficiency scoring of GCC countries. In fact, due to the substantial subsidies on electricity, gasoline, and
diesel, the GCC region performs lower in energy efficiency indices than the Levant countries or North African
countries in the MENA region [9]. Furthermore, due to the high-energy-intensive manufacturing sectors in the
region, energy intensity in GCC countries is quite high, being at least double the OECD average in all countries [15].
Table 1. Energy subsidization data in the GCC region in 2016.
Source: International Energy Agency.
Country
Average subsidization rate (%) Subsidy per capita ($/person) Total subsidy as share of GDP (%)
2014 2016 2014 2016 2014 2016
GCC countries
Bahrain 60 38 1697 740 6.7 3.2
Kuwait 81 62 2528 1132 5.1 4.1
Oman 64 – 1775 – 9.0 –
Qatar 69 24 2754 441 3.0 0.6
Saudi Arabia 79 52 2428 992 9.5 4.6
UAE 55 37 1868 793 4.4 2
Other
countries
China 2.2 4 13 27 0.2 0.3
India 17 6 30 10 1.9 0.6
Iran 82 65 994 435 19 9.2
The drivers behind the high energy consumption in the GCC region are related to low prices rendered to citizens
by so-called “rentier states”. The tribal rentier institutions of the GCC countries have successfully granted welfare
benefits and public services for free or low prices as some forms of “grants by the rulers”. In this special case,
energy subsidization is less related to poverty or social welfare aspects and more to the basic social contract of
these rentier states [7]. The state involvement is also strong in the water sector through desalination of seawater.
For many decades, rulers of GCC states chose to portray their kingdoms as “hydro states” utilizing technology and
energy reserves to provide cheap potable water for their citizens (see [16]). As a result, the combination of high
water and energy subsidization has long hindered market-based competition and limited ecological modernization
in the region [17].
The high energy consumptions and intensities in the region are also caused by the hot and dry climate, which
induces energy-intensive water and food production systems [18,19]. In fact, around 4%–12% of total electricity
production is used for desalination [20]. At the same time, electricity consumption for desalination will triple in the
MENA region by 2030 due to rising demands by growing populations and economies [21]. Furthermore, cooling
is the lead sector for electricity consumption in the region, e.g. 80% of total electricity consumption in Saudi
Arabia [22]. With population and economic growth, the bill for subsidies is rising, a fact that has driven GCC
governments to rethink the lavish energy subsidies by exploring energy efficiency and technological measures to curb
the rising emissions, and by initiating measures to decouple economic growth from environmental degradation [23].
4. “Common but differentiated” energy subsidy reforms
The energy subsidy reforms in the GCC region started around the same time and are similar in their progression
towards a lower level of subsidization. While the UAE ignited the first wave of reforms after the financial troubles
of emirates such as Dubai in the aftermath of the 2008/2009 financial crises, other countries followed suit and
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Table 2. Energy subsidy cuts in GCC countries.
Source: International Energy Agency.
Country
Total fossil-fuel subsidies in million USD Overall reduction in financial subsidy costs in 2016 as % of 2014
2014 2016 Oil Electricity Gas Total
Bahrain 2059 1034 89% 28% – 50%
Kuwait 5692 4538 74% 21% 1% 20%
Oman 90 84 6% – – 6%
Qatar 4465 1010 89% 68% 75% 77%
Saudi Arabia 57116 29661 51% 39% 47% 48%
UAE 15293 7344 94% 55% 30% 52%
enacted important reforms, particularly in the period after the sharp decline in oil prices in 2014. Between 2014
and 2016, most of the reforms were initiated, leading to some cuts in the overall financial burden of subsidies (see
Table 2). The set of adopted measures raised gas, fuel, electricity, and water prices in almost all countries, but with
differences in the timing and depth of the reforms [24,25]. Energy subsidization still remains high (see Table 1)
while the overall level of subsidy reduction can be described as “modest” [25].
The subsidy reforms in the GCC countries were carried out in the face of some protest, but with relatively
little overall opposition. In fact, the urgency of the pricing reforms was different in individual GCC countries,
while the political economic considerations vary across the countries depending on the level of vulnerability to
oil prices, the resource base, and the political participatory arrangements. Fattouh et al. [26] explain that countries
such as Oman and Bahrain generally have a lower resource base and serious fiscal deficits. This paved the way for
protests demanding economic reforms. Furthermore, Kuwait’s parliament has more power over the energy sector
and economic policies than in other GCC countries, resulting in difficulties in implementing structural reforms. This
is in contrast to Qatar, where resource abundance together with limited opposition minimized the politicization of
the reforms [26]. In fact, Saudi Arabia, as the biggest GCC country and with a very high vulnerability to oil prices,
has been under pressure to tackle the rising domestic demand for cheap energy. The energy reforms were thus made
a high priority for the political elite who communicated the urgency to the general public, who, at the start of the
reform, flooded social media channels with protest, also criticizing high state spending on weapon purchases and
the war in Yemen (see [25,26]). As for the UAE, although its economy is more diversified, the situation is similar
to Qatar with a high resource base and a very large expatriate population, who took the largest share of the financial
burden of the subsidy reductions.
The reduction of energy subsidies in the GCC countries was also accompanied by reforms in the water and food
sectors. The impact of these combined reforms extends beyond consumers to affect businesses and industries. [27]
examined these impacts, which negatively affected sectors such as agribusiness, logistics, or petrochemicals. For
example, in 2016 Saudi Arabia separated the price of methane (sales of gas for power generation) from that of
ethane, the price of which increased more than 130%, affecting costs for the petrochemical companies. Furthermore,
the agricultural sector is going to endure the costs of increased water and diesel prices. However, this move, together
with the decision in Saudi Arabia to phase out water-intensive green fodder such as alfalfa by 2019, is expected to
save some overexploited groundwater resources [27].
Apart from these adaptation problems in the transition phase, the subsidy reductions are expected to have
a positive impact on the economy and the environmental degradation in the region. For example, Wang et al.
[28] reviewed the impact of utility subsidy reform in Abu Dhabi and found an increase in GDP, a reduction in
carbon emissions, a decrease in private consumption, a decrease in carbon-intensive production, a decline in utility
production, but also a decrease in wages. With the reduction in wages being the only social cost of the reforms, the
results indicate that macroeconomic growth and employment were not affected by the higher prices in Abu Dhabi
as was the case in other studies on Kuwait, Egypt, or China [28].
In theory, adverse economic or industrial impacts of energy subsidy reforms can be compensated by more
targeted redistribution policies. In this sense, Gelan [29] simulated the impacts of subsidy reforms in Kuwait and
considered the case where users are compensated for losses through cash transfers. In such cases, the policy reforms
yield positive impacts on GDP and household welfare, as the adverse demand-side effects of reforms are limited.
Furthermore, in the GCC region, cash transfers to compensate households for price increases are being implemented;
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e.g., the Citizen’s Account program in Saudi Arabia. In general, however, cash transfer programs in the GCC are on
the rise, although they need to be sustained in the long run in order to offer some kind of reliable social protection
instrument from price increases for vulnerable households in GCC countries with poverty problems (e.g., Oman,
Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain) [30].
Finally, the subsidy reforms in the GCC countries need to be understood in the context of a wider restructuring
of the energy sector in line with national strategies advocating economic diversification across the region. This
restructuring targets private-sector participation, the level of integration, and also the energy mix. For example,
there is a paradigm shift in the GCC towards independent power producers (IPPs) who sell their output to state-
owned water and power companies as single buyers (SBs) through power-purchase agreements (PPAs). This new
IPP–SB–IPP model allows for the introduction of new energy sources such as renewables without jeopardizing the
power, revenues, and control of the state [7]. However, there are still important barriers to wide-scale adoption of
renewables including the remaining high level of subsidization, the lack of investments in R&D, the weak supply
chains, inadequate regulatory measures, and lack of public support through subsidies [9,10,31].
5. Conclusions — Not a “Big Bang”
Two questions arise from this study of the GCC experience, firstly with regard to the comprehensiveness of
the energy subsidy reform experience, and secondly to the consequences of these reforms on the underlying
social contract of the rentier states. With respect to the first question, the subsidization reforms are tangible, but
energy subsidization rates remain high by international comparison. The experience of the GCC region is also
heterogeneous. Smaller countries with a larger resource base (Qatar and UAE) were able to reduce the overall
economic burden of subsidies to lower levels than in other larger countries (Saudi Arabia). These cuts were also
more substantial than in countries with lower resources bases (Oman), or relatively strong political opposition
elements (Bahrain and Kuwait). In addition, free access to electricity and water, exemptions from price increases,
or preferential treatment through different tariff structures still exist for national citizens in Qatar, and partially in the
UAE, which limits the welfare impacts of subsidy reforms. Further missing links include the absence of adequate
compensating measures for the private sector as well as ineffective communication campaigns about the benefits
and urgency of the reforms [26]. The institutional structuring of the energy sector is also not comprehensive, since
incentives and regulatory measures for renewables and private sector participation are not yet in place.
Regarding the impacts on the rentier states, there seems to be a consensus in the literature that rentier politics
are evolving, but might not be eroding or diminishing. Rentier states seem to evolve and mobilize new sources of
rent through duties, eliminating wasteful practices, involving state companies in sectoral restructuring, and creating
more state-provided jobs [7,24]. To conclude, there are some tangible energy-subsidy reforms in the GCC countries.
While these reforms seem to be gradual, further research is needed on the welfare impacts of reforms, spill-overs
on use intensities and consumption, and the effectiveness of the deployed instruments. In fact, the subsidy reforms
in the GCC region represent a unique experience within the wider MENA area by virtue of their having a common
sense of urgency and direction while being implemented in the face of few protests. However, these reforms need
to be strengthened and accompanied by more long-term redistributive measures or broader, institutionalized welfare
mechanisms. Such a reform pathway can help the region to move away from an economic model dominated by
state involvement and energy resource abundance towards more diversified and dynamic economies. The success
of the restructuring of the energy sector will depend on allowing competition and providing the required incentives
for reducing energy intensities and introducing clean technologies.
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